

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY AND ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA UNDER THE APARTHEID REGIME – 1961-1967

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Abstract

The discussion of a diaspora's influence of a sovereign state's foreign policy provides a new perspective on the nature of international relations. Foreign policy in this context is analysed in this paper through various theoretical approaches. First, the Realist approach, examining inter-state relations between Israel and South Africa and the black continent states; The second approach, the Neoliberal approach, examining the processes of cooperation in social and economic areas; The third approach, the State-Diaspora model, examining the impact of the Jewish context on relations between Israel and South Africa. The diaspora phenomenon is universal. However, this case is unique due to the influence of the Jewish Diaspora over Israel's foreign policy. This unique discussion leads to the existence of a complex Israeli-Jewish foreign policy.

Keywords

Political realism, neoliberalism, diaspora, foreign policy, apartheid, Jewish community

Preface

Relations between Israel and South Africa were characterised from the start as amicable, apart from the period of 1961-1967, in which relations deteriorated. This was caused by Israel's support for the United Nation's resolutions in 1961 and 1962 condemning the racial apartheid regime and the imposition of sanctions on South Africa. Israel's objective in adopting this policy was to promote its interests in the international arena, while gaining political assistance from the African states. Israel's change of policy resulted in an immediate change in the approach of the South

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African Republic towards its Jewish population. This conflict had repercussions on the Zionist-Jewish agenda of the Israeli government, since such activity in the diplomatic arena was directly related to the issue of the status and welfare of the Jews of South Africa.

The study's objective is therefore the analysis of Israel's policy, as the State of the Jewish people,¹ regarding points of conflict on its South African agenda during this period.² On one hand, Israel's policy was to support the new states of Black Africa, both for idealistic and realist motives.³ The Israeli government expected these states to support its policy in the international arena pertaining to a resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict. On the other hand stood the Jewish interest, which entailed concern for the Jews' welfare and their status in South Africa.⁴ The question posed is: to what extent and how does an ethno-national diaspora influence the policy of the country of origin? In this case study, would the State of Israel, the country of origin of the Jewish people, striving to achieve its political objectives, sacrifice the vital interests of the South African Jewish community, and risk it becoming a distressed community? Would Israel's preference lie in enlisting this Diaspora's support over the necessity to assist this community, which could suffer politically and economically in consequence to Israel's policy in Africa?⁵

The analysis of Israel's national objectives will be made in reference to the three components in the triangular relationship between Israel, the Jewish community of South Africa, and the South African government. The first is Israeli-South African relations at their lowest peak, 1961-1967. The second component is a product of the first, the influence of Israeli-South African relations on the relations between the Jewish community and Israel, the country of origin, and between this community and its country of settlement, South Africa. The third component, which dominated and influenced the first two, was the relations between Israel and the new African states.⁶

This study, therefore, examines the nature of this policy, according to which on the one hand there is a need to realize state goals through cooperation with the Jewish community, and on the other hand, the need to realize the goals of the Jewish community in South Africa. The aim of this case study is to examine the extent of influence of the Jewish dimension over Israeli foreign policy. This paper will therefore present a theoretical examination, while emphasizing the influence of non-state factors –such as the diaspora –on shaping the foreign policy of the sovereign state. The discussion of these issues necessitates, at this stage, the presentation of a theoretical framework and background information as the basis of research.

Theoretical Framework

The definition of the State of Israel as the State of the Jewish people has repercussions for Israel's foreign policy. It can therefore be said that it is the foreign policy of a state influenced by the existence of an external Jewish diaspora and not the foreign policy of a geographically-defined nation-state. In the framework of this discussion, the Jewish case is unique since the existence of a Jewish diaspora is not due to economic, professional, or political considerations. The Jewish diaspora is unique in terms of the components of its temporal, geographic, ethnic, cultural and historical aspects.⁷ Moreover, its uniqueness lies also in the structure and system of ties existing between the parts of the Jewish people over centuries of Jewish history since the Temple destruction until the establishment of the State of Israel.⁸ The establishment of Israel changed the nature of these ties and the power relations between the various Jewish communities in the diaspora. Therefore, the national interest of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people is unique, comprising of the political goals of the State and the goals of the Jewish communities in the diaspora.⁹ This national interest pattern expresses the sense of joint destiny and the unique structure of the State of Israel, which permeates beyond its sovereign borders.¹⁰

This foreign policy is thus both complex and unique in the international arena. The theoretical analysis of this case study applies eclectic theoretical approaches, using as a theoretical starting point that of political realism.¹¹ This approach facilitates the understanding of international processes originating in initiatives by sovereign states acting rationally in the international arena. However, due to the uniqueness of the Israeli-Jewish case, we will also be assisted by the world politics approach¹² and the state-diaspora model.¹³

Political Realism places an emphasis on the existence of the sovereign state and its activity as a dominant entity in an anarchic international arena.¹⁴ The aim of the states operating in this arena is to secure their continued existence as sovereign and independent political entities. Therefore, according to political realism, the basis for existence of the sovereign state is its constant struggle for survival as a political unit, and its constant power struggle in the international arena.¹⁵

The state's survival depends on the extent of its success in the race to enhance its power and abilities in the international arena. States in general strive to enhance their abilities, particularly so in the military area. Their ability to improve their military capabilities significantly contributes to their continued survival as sovereign states in the anarchically-defined

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international arena. The constant drive for empowerment creates a reality of an ongoing conflict among states. Therefore, a basic premise in political realism is that states do not cooperate with each other. Such cooperation can exist only when it will contribute to the enhancement of the state's status and its continued survival.¹⁶

In the political reality in which the State of Israel operates, as the State of the Jewish people, Israel's foreign policy cannot be examined merely according to the tools of political realism, due to the singularity of the Israeli case, which reaches beyond the theoretical framework of the sovereign national state. The existence of a Jewish diaspora requires the application of a more extensive and complex approach in the analysis of Israeli foreign policy. Therefore the neo-liberal approach of world politics is applied here, as it deals with the influence of non-state political actors.¹⁷ According to this approach, international relations are not based on the existence of sovereign states only, but on additional, non-governmental factors that are influential in their own spheres of action. Analysis of foreign policy according to this approach places an emphasis on cooperation expressed in dialogue, negotiation and bargaining on common issues between governmental and non-governmental units. The world politics approach permits a wide spectrum of ties between states and non-state entities. One such relationship is the connection between a state and its nationals residing outside its borders. The nature of this connection can be examined by using the state-diaspora model.

The approach of state-diaspora relations deals with ties between the sovereign state and its members living in various diaspora communities.¹⁸ Country of origin-country of settlement relations impact on the status and future of the diaspora communities. The country of origin operates in favour of its diaspora community, which could have repercussions on country of origin-country of settlement relations. The diaspora itself, as a political entity, could also influence country of origin-country of settlement relations.¹⁹ Thus, this approach is suitable for examining the relations between Israel and South Africa as well as that of Israel and the Jewish community against the backdrop of the Apartheid regime during this period.

Israeli foreign policy will be analysed here using political realism tools as well as tools presented by other approaches, the world politics approach and the state-diaspora model. This study examines whether Israeli foreign policy was based on political realism or whether its foreign policy constituted in fact a Jewish foreign policy during this period.

The Jewish Community in South Africa: Between Conflict and Cooperation

The history of the South African Jewish community is intertwined to a great degree with the historical processes of the establishment of the South African Republic, and as result is evidence of the Jews' integration in this country. This is the background from which arose the diplomatic crisis between Israel and South Africa, and its impact on the Jewish community. Gideon Shimoni, in his comprehensive study²⁰ on the Jewish community and the Zionist Movement in South Africa, presents an extensive history of the Jews' integration in this part of the world, since the beginning of colonisation. Shimoni focuses on a number of important stages in the development of the South African Republic, which began with the first wave of Dutch settlers who arrived at the southernmost point of the African continent in 1652 as employees of the Dutch East India Company.²¹

The British wave of immigration brought with it Jewish immigrants from Britain and Germany who arrived in two immigration waves, 1882-1912 and during the 1930s.²² These immigration waves influenced Jewish life, not only culturally and organisationally, but also economically and politically. The first community was founded in 1841 in Cape Town, and in 1910, when South Africa became independent, most of the Jewish institutions were already functioning.²³ Nevertheless, the biggest and most significant immigration wave arrived in this area at the end of the 19th century, with the immigration of Jews from Lithuania, following the discovery of gold and diamond deposits.²⁴

These new immigrants entered the ranks of the Jewish community leadership and a process of cultural and social merging commenced between the community's two sectors – the British-German and the Lithuanian-East European sectors. Each contributed its unique characteristics to the creation of a new Jewish community in South Africa.²⁵ The height of this merging process was in the 1940s, during the Second World War. The activities of two central Jewish organisations were already prominent by this period: The Zionist Federation, established in 1896 as a Lovers of Zion association, and the Jewish Board of Deputies, established in 1903. These organisations, which led the community, were involved to a great degree in the dispute that erupted at a later period between the Jewish community and the State of Israel following the Israeli policy on the Apartheid regime.

In 1962, seven members of Parliament were from the South African Jewish community. Many Jews worked for their living in jobs associated

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with a low economic status, such as taxi drivers and shop keepers. Many other Jews enjoyed a high economic status, employed as lawyers, company managers and doctors. Yet, they all led comfortable lives.²⁶ This was due to the positive political and social climate towards the Jews, which enabled them to lead a life of comfort and prosperity, despite the underlying racist policy towards this community.

Israel's support for the UN proposal condemning South Africa and the imposition of sanctions in the years 1961 and 1962 placed the Jewish community in a difficult situation. It unearthed hidden antisemitic tendencies, which were upheld by many in South Africa. The roots of this hatred were set in the first days of the Jewish community in the country.²⁷ One of the events that left their mark were clauses in the 1864 Transvaal Republic's Constitution, according to which Jews were not granted the right to vote and were restricted in the areas of education and civil rights. This phenomenon appeared also in the first elections held in 1910, among parties that ran for election supporting this anti-Semitic trend.²⁸

Within this ambivalent system of relations the growth of pro-Nazi and antisemitic forces was facilitated. The various organizations gained power and status within South African society in the 1920s and 1930s.²⁹ In this era the antisemitic political and cultural organizations were rejuvenated, such as for example, the German Nazi Party Club, established already in 1932, the South African National Democratic Party, the People's Movement and the Deutsche Bund, a pro-Nazi cultural organisation, and the 'shirt' organisations, which provided the organisational frameworks for the implementing an ideology based on the white man's supremacy in South Africa. Within the 'shirt' organizations the 'Greyshirt' organisation was the most prominent.³⁰ The chauvinistic Louis T. Weichardt, who espoused a struggle against all non-Afrikaaner foreigners including the Jews established this organization in 1933. He backed Hitler's regime and policy but emphasized his loyalty to white South Africa. Many of this organization's members had a major share of South Africa's leadership, such as Prime Minister F. Verwoerd who led South Africa in the late 1950s and 1960s, during the crisis of relations between Israel and South Africa. Verwoerd was a chauvinistic, fanatic, and racist leader.³¹ In April 1960, a report reached Israel's Foreign Ministry from its legation in South Africa, describing Verwoerd as a racist who developed the theory of white racial supremacy. During his term as prime minister, a period of cruel oppression against non-whites was launched, and racial separation laws were passed.³²

The political system of South Africa was comprised also of liberal proponents, such as Jan Christian Smuts among the leaders of the liberal

wing. These leaders belonged to the bible-loving Christians, who identified with the Jewish people and with its sufferings. Additionally, the head of the antisemitic national party, Daniel Malan, brought about a serious change in the attitude of his party to Jews in 1948, when it rose to power in South Africa. He conducted a policy of appeasement between the ruling National party and the Jewish community and indeed this policy succeeded in removing the subject of the Jews from the South African political agenda in the 1950s and early 1960s.³³

In short, the relationship between the Jewish community and South African society at large was motivated by feelings of sympathy and a wish for cooperation with the Jews and with Israel. Liberal South Africans perceived the State of Israel as the fulfilment of the Bible's prophecies.³⁴ Yet, this relationship with the local Jewish community was also influenced by the existence of antisemitic and racist components in South African culture, as was expressed in South Africa's immigration policy and in the operation of pro-Nazi organisations within its borders.

The South African Jewish Community in the Wake of Changes in Israeli Foreign Policy: October 1961-November 1962

In March 1960, violent incidents broke out between the South African government and black Africans, which resulted in the death of 80 people in the town of Sharpeville.³⁵ This incident exacerbated the already-difficult situation in which the Jewish community found itself: it increased the inter-racial and inter-religious political tensions, which brought to the surface several questions regarding the continued Jewish existence as a minority in this country, which was becoming progressively more isolated, sensitive and vulnerable due to the approach towards South Africa in the international arena. The racist climate and domestic policy continued throughout 1960 and was expressed towards the Jews in the beginning of 1961.³⁶ Antisemitic decisions were passed that year against Jews, for example, the cancellation of the Hebrew language as an examination language in school Matriculation and in university entrance exams, and the cancellation of Jews' recruitment orders to serve in the army. This climate even had detrimental effects on the Jews' position within Parliament, such as the incitement campaign launched against Alec Gorshel from Cape Town,³⁷ a Jewish Parliamentary representative of the opposition United Party.³⁸

This negative climate towards the Jews of South Africa further escalated until it reached a peak in October 1961, when Israel voted for the UN proposal to condemn the Apartheid regime in South Africa. The

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South African Foreign Minister, Eric Louw, in his address at the UN General Assembly,³⁹ defended his government's Apartheid policy. This position was attacked by the representatives of the African states, headed by Liberia, who demanded that Louw's speech be struck from the record. The UN General Assembly succeeded in passing a majority vote, with Israel's support, to censure the South African policy expressed in this speech.⁴⁰ For South Africa, Israel's support of this resolution was a stinging insult to its own policy towards Israel. South Africa was shocked by Israel's step, since, besides Israel and Holland, no Western state voted in favour of the resolution, merely abstained. Consequently, Louw accused Israel of hostility and ingratitude,⁴¹ claiming that any South African with a religious or racial-ethnic connection with Israel must disassociate himself from the hostile and ungrateful actions of the Israeli Mission to the UN.⁴²

In response, all the Jewish organisations in South Africa presented a unified front, viewing Israel's step as mistaken and justifying the South African government's indignation. An even harsher tone was sounded by the South African Zionist Revisionists in their newspaper, the *Jewish Herald*.⁴³ The Jewish Board of Deputies,⁴⁴ the second Jewish organisation in size and influence in South Africa, also published its reservations and critique of Israel's policies in the national paper the *Star*. This unified front stemmed from the organizations' perceived need to preserve the Jews' relations with the regime, despite the existence of opposition to apartheid by the liberal Jews.

In the wake of the events following Louw's speech in the UN, a meeting was convened between representatives of the Zionist Federation, the Jewish Board of Deputies and representatives of the Israeli Legation in Johannesburg. The Jewish organisations proposed the publication of an article in support of the South African government in the Zionist newspaper the *Zionist Record* in which they would voice their 'disappointment from Israel's vote on the UN resolution, which impinges on the principle of freedom of speech'.⁴⁵ They proposed adding a demand that action will be taken to foil any drastic steps that might be implemented by the South African government against the Zionist Movement and the Jews in general. The Head of the Israeli Mission to Pretoria, Simcha Pratt, objected to this move, protesting against any presentation of reservations against the policy of the Israeli government. 'Official reservations on this case,' said Pratt, 'would constitute a change, and would serve as a dangerous precedent regarding statements by local Jewry on Israel's vote against South Africa.'

Israeli foreign policy in this context is characterised as state-based. In this case, clear preference was given to the state interest, in view of Israel's expectation for a long-lasting policy in the international arena, supported by the African states in the international institutions, and the expectation of a change in future to the structure of the South African regime. Therefore, Israeli foreign policymakers acted as they did, despite the detrimental effect on the welfare of the Jews of South Africa and the subordination of the Jewish organisations in South Africa to this policy.

In the beginning of November 1961, fears grew of a worsening of the crisis between Israel and South Africa, following information that Israel would support the imposing of sanctions on South Africa and the annulment of its mandate over South-West Africa.

Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Michael Comay, warned Foreign Ministry Assistant Director General Kidron of the dangers the Jewish community in South Africa would face:

If we are facing a crisis in Israeli-South African relations, the community itself will be in the complex position of 'dual loyalty'. We must inform them in advance of our considerations, where possible, instead of having them caught by surprise. Let us therefore brief Pratt on conducting an exchange of words with the local leadership on the subject.⁴⁶

Indeed, Pratt attempted to communicate with the community's leadership, predominantly the leadership of the two prominent Jewish organisations – the Zionist Federation and the Jewish Board of Deputies – without much success. The government's political and social pressure on the community was great, and could not facilitate the dialogue between Pratt and the local leadership, particularly regarding the Jewish Board of Deputies, which saw itself as representative and mouthpiece of the entire South African Jewry. In contrast, the Zionist Federation leaders refrained from voicing their criticism and displeasure with Israel's policy in this case.⁴⁷ In the opinion of the heads of the Jewish Board of Deputies, Israel should have abstained on the UN vote, rather than actively supporting the condemnation. Pratt's words fell on deaf ears when he tried to justify Israel's policy as beneficial to Israel's vital interests directly and the Jewish community indirectly.⁴⁸ In continuation to the community's statement that it wished to live in comfort and ease, Pratt claimed that in such a reality, the uncertain future also created antagonism on the part of the community towards the Israeli policy, due to fear of damage to Jews' property.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, Pratt did state that the policy set in Jerusalem should be continued, despite the harm that could be inflicted on the Jewish community. Besides the social-political and economic damage, the most

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significant damage for the community was the restrictions imposed upon it in transferring fundraising contributions for Israel. The inability to transfer the funds constituted a serious blow to the continued political and cultural activity of South African Jewry, since the severing of the link between the Jewish diaspora community and its country of origin signified, according to the South African Zionist leadership, an essential hit to the continued identity of the community as Jewish and Zionist, whose very existence was derived from this connection.

Imposition of Restrictions on the Transfer of Funds to Israel

Following Israel's support of the UN resolution, the government of Pretoria decided to hold up the transfer of money allocated for Israel, which was collected by the South African Zionists. In past years, the South African government permitted the bi-annual transfer of millions of Rands of money and goods to Israel. However, it now forbade the Zionist leadership to transfer these monies to Israel.

The purpose of these restrictions and prohibitions was to harm Israel economically.⁵⁰ However, more than it did so, it inflicted a direct and painful blow to the connection between the Jewish community and Israel. Disrupting these ties, which were one of the channels for tightening relations between this diaspora and Israel, could have caused political and spiritual damage to the community by decreasing Jewish political activity and by diminishing its ties with Israel.

The state of Israel, on its part, did not give up on the funds, and tried to get the Jewish community in South Africa to persuade the government of Pretoria to transfer the money after all.⁵¹ The Zionist Federation acted jointly with the Jewish Board of Deputies to change the policy of the South African government on this matter, since the Jewish community perceived itself as the main injured party in the political dispute between Israel and South Africa, as described by Edel Horowitz, Chair of the Zionist Federation at his meeting with Dr. Donges, South African Minister of the Interior (in January 1962).

Horowitz, in his report on the meeting to the Federation leadership stated that this issue constituted one of the most severe blows to the Zionist Movement in South Africa since its foundation 60 years earlier (1896).⁵² This increased their uncertainty regarding the future of the Zionist activity in South Africa, fears of the collapse of the Zionist Movement's institutions in the country. Consequently, the leaders of the Zionist Federation and the Jewish Board of Deputies petitioned jointly to the Minister of Interior for a change in policy.

In a joint meeting, the Minister of Interior stated that as a past supporter of the Zionist endeavour, he understood the importance of transferring the contributions,⁵³ but that reality changed after Israel's 'slap in the face' to South Africa, and therefore his government could not act according to *status quo ante*, as this might lead to anti-Semitic reactions, which the government of South Africa could not allow. In order to bring about a change, he urged the leaders of the prominent Jewish organisations to take up their case with the government of Israel. The minister claimed that the 'door was not locked' and a change in policy was possible should Israel act differently.

The Jewish community was therefore compelled to put up with Israel's unilateral policy. Although the State of Israel was the one directly hit, the situation did have an indirect influence on the continuation of Jewish Zionism in South Africa. This study shows that in this case, the diaspora-related economic factor had no influence on the Israeli government, which preferred the creation of diplomatic ties with developing countries in Africa to potential harm to the welfare of the Jews of South Africa.

Israeli-South African Relations: November 1962-August 1967

The State of Israel saw in the creation of deep and extensive ties with the new African states a strategic means for the resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict. When the Israeli government decided to support the UN sanctions on South Africa, Israeli foreign policy in this period (November 1962) was decidedly anti-South African. During this period, Israel was at the peak of its honeymoon relations with the new African states. This was expressed by the considerable foreign aid provided by Israel to states in West Africa, as Ghana, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, as well as states south and east of the Sahara, as Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and the Central African Republic.⁵⁴ The political changes occurring at the time in the international arena, particularly the process of decolonisation, influenced Israel to raise the Middle Eastern issue on the international agenda, and brought about Israel's readiness to reach dialogue with the Arab states without prior conditions. The Israeli government saw the UN institutions as the arena for influencing the Arab states, via resolutions made, to open up diplomatic channels for peace negotiations, with the aim of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel's policymakers realised that the General Assembly convened in November 1962 was the arena in which they should endeavour to take advantage of the expansion of relations with the African states, following the enhanced de-colonisation process-taking place at the time.

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However, Israel's Mission to the UN, headed by Foreign Minister Golda Meir, was compelled to change its plans, rendering all their efforts futile. Short-term geo-strategic objectives were the ones that ultimately tipped the scales. It was the American demand by President John Kennedy that Israel refrain from proposing a resolution to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict by peaceful means,⁵⁵ following the request at the UN of several moderate Muslim states that the Israeli Mission refrained from raising the issue. Indeed, President Kennedy informed Golda Meir unequivocally at a meeting between them that the US was requested by the Muslim states to vote against such a proposal. Although the US President could not see himself voting against a call for an Arab-Israeli peace, he was informed that should the US vote in favour of such a resolution, all the Arab states would automatically take the side of the Soviet Union and place a counter vote to the US position, whatever the subject. Consequently, the US President made Israel remove the issue from the agenda, and hinted that this relinquishment would be recompensed with US military foreign aid to Israel.⁵⁶

Despite this, the Israeli government continued with the political line it set on October 1961. On November 6, 1962, Israel supported the resolution of the Afro-Asian bloc to impose sanctions on South Africa.⁵⁷ Israel's Mission to the UN voted for the sanctions but did not support the Ghanaian and Indian proposal to ban South Africa from the UN or to impose unprecedented sanctions that would bring about its collapse.⁵⁸ Israel refrained from supporting resolutions whose aim was to harm South Africa *per se*, but rather, to support sanctions that would influence the South African government to abolish its Apartheid policy. In this context, Gideon Shimoni adds that the State of Israel refrained from supporting the Ghanaian and Indian proposals so as not to inflict harm on the local Jewish community, which would suffer as result of an overall and extensive blow to South Africa.⁵⁹ From Israel's point of view, this would constitute an unnecessary injury to the Jews' welfare in the diaspora.

Israel's support of the UN resolution resulted in a major crisis among whites in South Africa, and reactions towards the Jewish community were not long in coming, as described below. Prime Minister Verwoerd focused specifically on Israel's vote over those of the other states.⁶⁰ He perceived the Jewish community as a victim of the situation caused by the Israeli government, and demanded it expressed its loyalty to South Africa in order to put an end to the discomfort experienced by this community.

Israel's support of the sanctions against South Africa and the comments by Prime Minister Verwoerd raised the anxiety level of South African Jewish leadership, which feared accusations and even physical violence. The leaders of the Zionist Federation and the Jewish Board of

Deputies convened several urgent meetings to discuss their response to the new reality, following the Israeli policy. There was immense external pressure, particularly on the Board of Deputies, as representative of the entire Jewish community, to announce its response to Israel's support of the UN sanctions. The Board's chair, Teddy Schneider, pronounced in a press release the discomfort felt among the South African Jews at the situation and emphasised their loyalty to South Africa, and that they are not responsible for the policy of Israel.⁶¹

On November 11, 1962, an emergency conference was convened jointly by the Zionist Federation and the Board of Deputies to which Simcha Pratt was invited. This all-Jewish conference raised the problem facing the community. The two organisations felt ambivalence towards the problem created. On the one hand they expressed disappointment on Israel's vote against South Africa, and on the other, they expressed resentment towards the South African's government supporters, who tended to perceive the Jews as responsible for Israel's actions.

Following Israel's support of sanctions, relations between Israel and South Africa deteriorated, to a greater extent than during the period following Israel's previous vote at the UN, in October 1961. These culminated in the recall of the Israeli Head of Mission to Jerusalem without providing a replacement, in September 1963. Yet, surprisingly, the pressure on the part of the South African government towards the local Jews was not as direct and menacing as previously. Rather, it was expressed more moderately, while placing greater significance on the issue of double loyalty, which compelled the local Jewish leaders to issue clear statements regarding their discomfort and disappointment with Israel's policy.

This relationship continued for several years, with indirect implications for the Jewish community in a number of areas. Three areas are discussed here; those which had an effect on the relationships between the three actors (Israel, South Africa and the Jewish community), and Israel's relations vis a vis the African states, until the outbreak of the Six-Day War in 1967. These are: Israeli-South African trade relations; the attempt to stop El Al flights to South Africa; and antisemitic activity.

Israeli-South African Trade Relations

The bilateral trade relations between the two countries took a hit following Israel's support of the UN resolution to impose sanctions, with Israel limiting its trade volume with South Africa. This topic occasionally made headlines, such as with the question of supplying Uzi submachine guns to South Africa,⁶² fish imports⁶³ and other products.⁶⁴ Discussion of

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this issue requires the examination of Israel's conduct in a comparative context with such cases such as Israel's continued economic ties with France against the backdrop of the question of the future of the Jews in Algiers,⁶⁵ or the problematic economic ties with Argentina during the 1970s and 1980s. In the present case, the Israeli government restricted its economic ties with South Africa,⁶⁶ while in the other two cases the Israeli government continued with its existing policy, despite the fact that an existential threat lay over the entire Jewish community, in the case of Algiers, or over part of the community, as in Argentina.⁶⁷

Israel acted in the present case according to the same general format but under different guidelines. Israel set its policy in this context according to its objectives regarding the target state. In contrast to the other two cases, here Israel set its eyes on two targets, the African states, on which the Israeli Foreign Ministry focused, and South Africa. Israel's support of the sanctions, for the advancement of its national-economic objectives in Africa, caused the change in relations, to the detriment of the Jewish community. The Jewish community was in constant fear of harsh economic steps taken against them.

Israel's foreign policy in the African context had altruistic, economic and political objectives that constituted the basis for the relations with the African states. The government of Israel had no expectations of profiting from its investments in Africa in the short-term in view of the poor situation of these countries, both economically and from a humanitarian perspective. Therefore, Israel's expectations were pretty low at this stage, and were summed by its expectation to gain a political dividend in the international arena, in the framework of the international institutions and organisations.

However, in practice, not only did Israel not benefit from its policy in Africa in the political arena, it became unpopular in several countries. At this stage, the lack of sympathy for Israel among the new states derived from their economic and political situation. Despite the assistance provided by Israel, they preferred the more extensive economic assistance and significant support of those Arab states who offered it, within international frameworks which enhanced the status of the new states in the international arena. Verwoerd even accused Israel of causing Egypt to act in opposition to South African policy due to Egypt's ties with Israel. In this arena, a number of incidents occurred in which Nasser attempted to place hurdles before Israeli policy, for example, his successful endeavour to pass an anti-Israeli resolution at the Casablanca Bloc Conference in the early 1960s, denouncing Israel 'as an instrument in the service of imperialism', which was detrimental to Israeli relations with African states.⁶⁸

Thus, examination of Israel's overall foreign relations in this context shows that Israel was unsuccessful in its endeavours to advance its economic and political objectives in Africa, despite having greatly restricting its economic ties with South Africa as a means of realising this objective.⁶⁹ Therefore, Israel's political adventure in Africa can be viewed as a failure, both from the Israeli and Jewish national interest. Israel suffered to a certain extent from the unrealised potential of political and economic ties with the new African states, from the blow to its status vis a vis the Republic of South Africa, and from the blow to the status of the Jews of South Africa, socially and politically.

The attempt to stop El Al flights to South Africa

During the first months of 1963, the Israeli foreign office formed a plan to cancel the EL AL flights to South Africa, as part of the sanctions imposed on that country. The leaders of the South African Jews opposed this plan from the start. For example, Maisels,⁷⁰ a Jewish judge and one of the community's leaders, met with foreign minister Golda Meir and conveyed to her that the Jews of South Africa would prefer Israel not to rush to be the first of the states represented in South Africa to impose sanctions upon the country. To this, Meir responded that the Foreign Office had reached a decision to act at the earliest opportunity, and that suggestions have been made to await a final decision by the government.⁷¹ At a meeting with the foreign minister, in August 1963, Gideon Rafael, the director general, expressed his fears of the repercussions to Israel should it not act prior to the UN General Assembly of October 18, 1963. Indeed, Meir's decision had operational aspects, as she presented at the meeting:

EL Al cannot fly to South Africa without a stopover either in Nairobi or in Dar-es-Salaam. Kenya will receive independence on 12 December. We assume that Kenya, after becoming independent, will not permit a stopover of aircrafts travelling to South Africa. There is also a security risk, perhaps from Egypt, in landing in Kenya prior to 12 December...⁷²

According to the formulation of the plan, flights to South Africa were scheduled to cease on 5 December, and not 12 December, according to Harry Horowitz. He claims that in the meeting held between Golda Meir and the representatives of the Zionist Federation, she informed them that halting the flights a week early would show the African states that Israel stood behind its international commitments. The Jewish delegation claimed on their part that 'Such a step would bring the Jews to

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desperation, since EL AL flights were their bridge to Israel'.⁷³ Golda Meir responded by saying that Israel would not change its policy as due to its history and ethics, Israel must adopt a moral stand on apartheid. Israel would have severed its ties entirely with the country had it not been for the sizable Jewish community in South Africa.⁷⁴ Regarding the necessity of the flights, Golda Meir recommended that the Jews immigrate to Israel as a solution,⁷⁵ showing clearly that Israel's top priority was the national political interest. Meir used the moral universalistic claim as a cover for the realisation of particular political objectives.

In practice, the idea of halting EL AL flights to South Africa was not realised. Israel decided not to act upon its decision, which would only harm South African Jewry, while having no benefit in the African arena. Furthermore, no demand of this kind was made by the African states, who understood the situation.

Antisemitic Activity

The situation of South African Jews deteriorated in the wake of events above-mentioned, both materially and in terms of their public confidence. Antisemitic activities spread. This phenomenon had its roots in the political culture of extreme groups in South Africa, who now took advantage of the situation to increase their activities against Jewish entities in the country. For example, the antisemitic activities of esoteric organisations of Raymond Rudman, John Schoeman,⁷⁶ and Tacura,⁷⁷ who maintained ties with organisations outside South Africa, such as the Klu-Klux-Klan in the US, and with others.

The antisemitic activities had moral-spiritual and physical targets. In the moral-spiritual area, progressively more aggressive antisemitic newspaper reports published in the South African press accused the Jews of a lack of loyalty to the South African regime. Physical expressions of antisemitism continued the line taken by these organisations prior to the Israeli change of policy towards south Africa, for example the bombing of the Great Synagogue in Johannesburg in January 1961, and the destruction of a monument in the Jewish cemetery in Johannesburg in June 1962⁷⁸ in the wake of the Eichmann trial.⁷⁹ Incidents such as these were repeated in Pretoria in September 1965,⁸⁰ and in April 1966 – on the anniversary of Hitler's birthday – when two synagogues were damaged in Johannesburg. The significance of these incidences for the Jewish community was far greater than the actual damage and pain inflicted, as can be seen in documents of the Foreign Ministry and the Jewish Agency,

as no physical harm was actually inflicted, neither significant nor widespread harm to Jewish property.⁸¹

The apprehensions of the Jewish population in South Africa from anticipated (rather than actual) harm rising from antisemitic activity in this country were shared by Zionists and non-Zionists alike. In an inter-regional conference of the Jewish Board of Deputies in October 1963, a clear statement was made that ‘while the Jews’ status in this country has clearly deteriorated, it has yet to express itself in a tangible and public manner.’⁸² A similar atmosphere was felt in the 28th bi-annual convention of the Zionist Federation in South Africa, which gave voice to apprehensive and disgruntled opinions, that the change wrought following the Israeli foreign policy towards South Africa was harmful to the Jews, and that contrary to any other nation, the Jews’ hands were tied, due to their unique sensitivity and their greater vulnerability.⁸³ Some compared the atmosphere in the convention to the atmosphere felt by Central European Jews in the summer of 1939.

At the Jewish Agency board meeting of June 1963, Chair A. Pinkus spoke of his impressions from his visit to South Africa.⁸⁴ He recounted how the South African government manipulated the Jewish community into a no-way-out situation, following the events derived from the change in relations between the two countries. The South African government did not declaratively encourage antisemitic activity but it did force the Jews to openly take a stand in support of the Apartheid regime. From a realist perspective for Israel, this was the price it expected the Jewish community to pay in its support.

Conclusion: Jewish-Israeli Foreign Policy

This study focused on the triangle of relations, at the centre of which stood the State of Israel. One side of this complex relationship was the Israel-South African bilateral relations, and its focus – Israel’s foreign policy regarding the racial segregation policy enacted in Africa. Regarding the second side - the relations between Israel and the new African states – this study dealt with the essence and objectives of the relationship. Regarding the third side, the study examined how the changes in the two arenas above affected the relationship between the State of Israel and the South African Jewish community.

The State of Israel acted to achieve its political objectives in the international arena on the African continent while attempting to enlist the African states to its diplomatic-political struggle to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict within the international institutions. However, at the same time Israel also endeavoured to look after the interests of the Jewish

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community while striving to minimise and prevent harm to its status and welfare. This policy, which was supposedly expressed in two separate channels – the state and the diaspora – is a unique foreign policy because Israel, as the state of the Jewish people, cannot separate its political objectives and those of the Jews in the diaspora.

The State of Israel has a commitment towards Jewish communities outside Israel. The situation in which it exists and operates makes it difficult for it to act 'normally', as a sovereign state protecting its vital interests on the one hand and on the other, a state protecting interests beyond its geographical borders. Therefore, Israel implements a foreign policy that is based on the principles of political realism on the one hand, and on the other hand on the principles of world politics and the state-diaspora model. This study demonstrates that Israel's foreign policy in this case was, therefore, an Israeli-Jewish foreign policy.

Notes

¹ See discussion on the definition and essence of the State of Israel as the State of the Jewish people as reflected in the law of Return, the Law of Citizenship and the legal status of the Jewish Agency for Israel, in Amnon Rubenstein, *Judicial Law of the State of Israel* [Hebrew], Vol. 1 (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Shoken, 2005), pp. 319-413. See also the Zionist definition of the Jewish State in Amnon Rubenstein, *To Be a Free Nation* (Jerusalem: Shoken, 1977) [Hebrew], p. 196; Amnon Rubenstein & Alexander Ya'akobson, *Israel and the Family of Nations* (Tel Aviv and Jerusalem: Shoken, 2003) [Hebrew], pp. 257-268; See reference to the definition of "the State of the Jews" in Yehezkel Dror, *Refounding Zionism* (Jerusalem: Hasifriya Hatzionit – Mossad Bialik, 1997) [Hebrew], pp. 127-129. See legal discussion on the issue of Israel as the State of the Jews or the Jewish State in the article by Claude Klein, "A Jewish State or State for the Jews", *The Jerusalem Quarterly* (Spring 1978), pp. 37-47; Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 56-71; Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (London: Oxford University press, 1972), pp. 229-250.

² Charles (Yeshayahu) Liebman, "Conflicting Interests in Israeli-Diaspora Relations", *Gesher* (January 1976), vol. 22, no. 1-2 [Hebrew], p. 60; See also, David Vital, *The Future of the Jews* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 29-63; Daniel J. Elazar, *People and State*, (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1989); See in his essay, "Land, State Diaspora in the History of Jewish Polity", *Jewish Political Studies Review*, Vol. 3 No. 1-2 (Spring 1991), pp. 3-31.

³ For expansion on this subject, see, Yitzhak Mualem, *The Jewish Dimension in Israeli Foreign Policy: Between Political Realism and Goals of the Jewish People* (Ph.D. diss., Bar-Ilan University, 1999) [Hebrew].

⁴ See extensive discussion on issue of State-Diaspora relations in, Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), *The Modern Diasporas in International Politics* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1986); James Clifford, "Diaspora", *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1994), pp. 302-338; On common characteristics of all diasporas see, Robin Cohen, "Diasporas and the nation-state from victims to challengers", *International Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 3 (1996), p. 515. Additional reference on the issue of Diaspora see in, Richard Marienstras, "On Notion of Diaspora", in Gerard Chaliand (ed.), *Minority Peoples In the Age of Nations States* (London: Pluto Press, 1989), pp.119-125; Yossi Shain and Martin Sherman, "Dynamics of disintegration: Diaspora, secession and the paradox of nation-states", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1998), pp.321-346. For a similar state of relations comprised of three factors namely the mother country, the host country and the community see: Natan Aridan, *Britain, Israel and Anglo Jewry 1949-97* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004).

⁵ See work by Gabriel Sheffer on the Jewish Diaspora: Gabriel Sheffer, "The Jewish Diaspora at a Crossroads", *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1990), pp. 31-44; Gabriel Sheffer, "From Israeli Hegemony to Autonomy of Diaspora", *Gesher*, Vol. 42 (132) (1995-96) [Hebrew], pp. 81-87; See also his article: "Towards Re-examination of Israeli-Diaspora Relations", *Gesher*, Vol. 44 (137) (1998) [Hebrew], pp. 23-31. See also, Charles S. Liebman, *Pressure Without Sanction* (London: Associated University Press, 1977); Charles S. Liebman and Steven Cohen, *Two Worlds of Judaism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). See also historical-philosophical analysis by Shimon Ravidovitz on the mutual interdependence between the State of Israel and the Diaspora in *Babel and Jerusalem*, Vol. 2 (London: Ararat, 1957) [Hebrew], pp. 724-769; See also article by Charles Liebman, "Elements and Symbols in the Politics of Israel-Diaspora Relations," *Kivunim*, No. 16 (August 1982) [Hebrew], pp. 127-135.

⁶ Naomi Hazan, "The Fallacies of Pragmatism: Israel's Policy Towards South Africa, 1974-1983", in Benyamin Neuberger (ed.), *War and Peacemaking* (Tel Aviv: Open University, 1992) [Hebrew], pp. 291-328; Interview with Simcha Pratt, Head of Israeli Mission in Pretoria in the 1960s, 9 January 1996; Benyamin Neuberger, "From Idealism to Pragmatism - Israel and the Third World 1948-1992", in *War and Peacemaking*, p. 497; *Meron Medzini, The Proud Jewess* (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1990) [Hebrew], p. 279; Golda Meir, *My Life* (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1975) [Hebrew], 231.

⁷ John. A. Armstrong, "Mobilized Proletarian Diasporas, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 70, No. 2 (1976), pp. 393-408; Anthony. D. Smith, "Zionism and Diaspora Nationalism", *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 2, No.2 (Winter 1995), pp. 1-12; Daniel Elazar, "The Jewish People As The Classic Diaspora: A Political Analysis", in Gabriel Sheffer (ed), *Modern Diasporas in International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986). pp. 212-257;

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David Biale, *Power and Powerlessness in Jewish History* (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), pp. 34-57; Ruth Wisse, *Jews and Power* (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), pp. 171-184.

⁸ Robin Cohen, "Diasporas and nation-state: from victims to challengers", *International Affairs*, Vol.72, No.3 (1996), pp. 507-520; Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 21-36.

⁹ See comment by Gabriel Sheffer on the uniqueness of the Jewish diaspora in Gabriel Sheffer & Hadas Roth-Toledano, *Who Leads? On Israeli-Diaspora Relations* (Jerusalem: Van Leer Jerusalem Institute/Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House, 2006) [Hebrew], pp. 304-306; Gabriel Sheffer, "Israel and the Jewish Diaspora from a worldwide comparative perspective", in Naomi Zabar, Gideon Shimoni and Nurit Hemo (eds.), *Jewish Peoplehood* (Tel Aviv: Diaspora Museum, 2009) [Hebrew], pp. 142-164; Gabriel Sheffer, "Is the Jewish Diaspora Unique", *Gesher*, Vol. 42, No. 142 (2000) [Hebrew], pp. 23-37; See also, Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp.106-114.

¹⁰ Daniel Elazar, "Israel-American Jewry Relations in the Context of the Global Jewish Political Community," *Kivunim* [Hebrew], no. 3 (Spring 1973), pp. 93-116. See in this context also Charles Liebman, Charles Liebman, *Pressure Without Sanctions* (New-Jersey: Fairleigh Dickson University Press, 1977).

¹¹ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). Michael Smith, *Realism Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Louisiana: Louisiana University Press, 1986); Benjamin Frankel (ed.), *Roots of Realism* (London-Portland: Frank Cass, 1996).

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¹³ John A. Armstrong, "Mobilized Proletarian Diaspora," *American Politics Science Review*, Vol. 70, No. 2 (January 1976), pp. 393-408; Gabriel Sheffer, *At Home Abroad: Diaspora Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Yossi Shain and Ahron Barth, "Diaspora and International Relations Theory," *International Organization*, Vol. 57 (Summer 2003), pp. 449-479.

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Cooperation: A Realist Critique of Newest Liberal Institutionalism”, *International Organization*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (August 1984), pp. 485-507; Robert Keohane, “Neo-realism and Study of World Politics”, in Robert Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, pp. 1-26.

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²² Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, pp. 13-30.

²³ Shimoni, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

²⁴ Marcus Arkin, “South Africa, Its Jews, and the Israel Connection”, *South Africa International*, vol. 8, No. 12 (October 1977), p. 86; see also: Eric Rosenthal, "On the Diamond Fields", in: Gustav Saron and Louis Hotz (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 105-120.

²⁵ Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, p. 29.

²⁶ Henry Katzew, "Jews in the Land of Apartheid", *Midstream*, vol. 8, No. 4 (December 1969), pp. 65-66; Tzippi Hoffman and Alen Ficher, *The Jews of South Africa: What Future?* (Johannesburg: Southern African Book,1988); Cyril Harris, *For Heaven's Sake* (London: Vallentin Mitchell, 2001).

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²⁷ Shimoni, *op. cit.*, p. 47; Gideon Shimoni, *Community and Conscience: The Jews in Apartheid South Africa* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2003), p. 6.

²⁸ Shimoni, *op. cit.*, p. 65; Milton Shain, *The Roots of Antisemitism in South Africa* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994), pp. 49-78; Gustav Saron, "Boers, Uitelnder Jews," in Gustav Saron and Louis Hotz (eds) *The Jews in South Africa* (Cape Town, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.185; Milton Shain, *The Roots of Antisemitism in South Africa* (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1994), p. 20.

²⁹ See expansion in Shimoni, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-185. Patrick J. Furlong, *Between Crown and Swastika* (Hanover and London: Wesleyan Press, 1991), pp.70-96. Gideon Shimol, *Jews and Zionism: The South Africa Experience 1910-1967* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1980) pp. 109-124. Gideon Shimoni, "Zionism in South Africa: in Alon Gal (ed.) *Zionism by Its Regions* vol. 3 (Jerusalem: The Zalman Shazar Center, Ben-Gurion Research Institute for the Study of Israel & Zionism and Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 2010) [Hebrew] pp. 327-368

³⁰ Furlong, *Between Crown and Swastika*, pp. 16-20. See also, Richard Mendelson and Milton Shain, *The Jews in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2008), pp. 105-133. Gideon Shimoni, *Community and Conscience – The Jews in Apartheid South Africa* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2003), pp. 13-14.

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³⁴ Alon Liel, *Black Justice - The South African Upheaval* (Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1999) [Hebrew]; Ephraim Inbar, *Outcast Countries in the World Community* (Denver: University of Denver,1985); Deon Geldenhuys, *Isolated*

States: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

³⁵ “The Crisis in South Africa”, *Monthly Review* (April 1960) [Hebrew], pp. 12-14.

³⁶ See report by Yaakov Doron, Consul to Johannesburg, to Foreign Office Director, Haim Yechiel, 16 January 1960, Israel State Archives, file no. 17/3300 – South Africa – Jews.

³⁷ See letter by Matityahu Sharon from Israeli legation in Cape Town to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 6 March 1961. See also, Gideon Shimoni, *Community and Conscience – The Jews in Apartheid South Africa*: University Press of New England, 2003).

³⁸ See on this issue, Gustav Sharon, “Israel and South Africa”, *Gesher*, Vol. 7, no. 4 (1962) [Hebrew], pp. 13-27; During this period, three incidents occurred in Parliament, on a Jewish-related issue, one of which regarded the Jewish background of delegate Alec Gorshel. Israel State Archives, file no. 9/3517 Foreign Office – Southern Africa - Jews. Most South African Jews supported the National Party headed by Prime Minister Verwoerd. See, Alon Liel, *Black Justice - The South African Upheaval*, p. 65.

³⁹ See remarks of South African foreign minister in the General Assembly, October 1961, Israel State Archives, file no. 16/3300.

⁴⁰ See resolutions and votes on this issue from 13 November 1961, *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Gideon Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism: The South Africa Experience 1910-1967* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 308.

⁴² Henry Katzew, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ See Israel State Archives, file no. 16/3300; See also in this file a support telegram of this organisation in the South African government, sent to South African Foreign Minister.

⁴⁵ Telegram from 20 January 1961, sent from Johannesburg to Jerusalem, Israel States Archives, file no. 16/3300.

⁴⁶ Letter from Michael Comay from Permanent Mission of Israel to the UN to the Foreign Office, 1 November 1961 – Israel State Archives, file no. 16/3300 – material on condemning South Africa.

⁴⁷ Gideon Shimoni, *op cit*, pp. 308-309.

⁴⁸ See Q & A pamphlet published by the Zionist Federation following this incident. Israel State Archives, file no. 16/3300 – material condemning South Africa.

⁴⁹ See letter by General Consul Y. Doron to envoy in Pretoria, Simcha Pratt, in which he reports the financial repercussions to Jews in the region of Johannesburg following the Israeli support for UN sanctions on South Africa, Israel State Archives, 17/3300 – South Africa – Jews; for discussion of threats of antisemitic acts against Jews, see Gideon Shimoni, *op cit*, p. 319.

⁵⁰ Gideon Shimoni, *op cit*, p. 317. See also correspondence on this issue by Simcha Pratt to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, 19 December 1961, Israel State Archive, file no. 28/3350 – South Africa – Magbit Appeal; and letter by

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Pratt to Aryeh Levavi, Assistant Director General, 7 December 1961, Israel State Archive, file no. 12/3300 – South Africa – Jews.

⁵¹ Letter by Simcha Pratt to Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, Israel State Archives, 28/3300 – Southern Africa – Appeal; Edgar Berenstein, "South African Jewish Community", *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 65 (1964), p. 344.

⁵² Gideon Shimoni, *op cit*, p. 318.

⁵³ *Ibid*, p. 319.

⁵⁴ Nathan Grossman, "Examination of the Concept 'Developing Countries' from Israel's International Relations Perspective", M.A. Thesis (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 1973)[Hebrew], p. 128. Polakow-Suransky, *The Unspoken Alliance*, pp. 27-29.

⁵⁵ H.S. Aynor, "Israel Versus Apartheid at the United Nations", *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol 8, No. 1 (March 1986), p. 40.

⁵⁶ *Meron Medzini, op. cit.*, p. 282.

⁵⁷ See details in pamphlet by Zionist Federation, note 42 above.

⁵⁸ See remarks by Levi Eshkol on the issue, claiming that the State of Israel had no interest in the total excommunication and isolation of South Africa, Knesset Protocols, vol. 38, 23 October 1963, pp. 50-53.

⁵⁹ Gideon Shimoni, *op cit*, pp. 330-331.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 331.

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 334. See reference to this issue in correspondence between legation in Pretoria to Director of British Commonwealth Dept., 12 November 1962, Israel State Archives, file no. 1/351, Southern Africa. Polakow-Suransky, *The Unspoken Alliance*, p. 31.

⁶² See letter by Matityahu Sharon from Israeli legation in Pretoria to S. Arad, Cape Town to Director of British Commonwealth Dept., 5 March 1963, Israel State Archives, file no. 2/130, Africa.

⁶³ See letter by Nitzan Hadas to Azriel Harel in Pretoria, 28 October 1963, Israel State Archives, file no. 1/103, Africa.

⁶⁴ On trade ties, see letter by Yaakov Doron to S. Ronen, 1 September 1963, *op. cit.* Polakow-Suransky, *The Unspoken Alliance*, pp. 39-47. Bilateral trade ties deteriorated significantly, expressed particularly in the drop in imports to Israel. In 1960, Israel imported 11 million dollars' worth of goods. (Statistical Abstract of Israel 1961, no. 12, p. 331) and dropped to 5.5 million dollars in 1962 (Statistical Abstract of Israel 1965, no. 16, p. 259; In 1965 the trade volume was 4.4 million dollars (Statistical Abstract of Israel 1967, no. 18, p. 220). Regarding export, the changes were marginal: in 1960, the export volume of Israel to South Africa was 3.4 million dollars (Statistical Abstract of Israel 1961, *op. cit.*) and in 1966 export dropped to 2.3 million dollars (Statistical Abstract of Israel 1967, *op. cit.*).

⁶⁵ In relation to the Jews of Argentina, see publication by Efraim Zadoff, "Israel's commitment to the Jews in the Diaspora in times of crisis – the case of Argentina, 1976-1983", *Bitachon Leumi* [Hebrew], nos. 2-3 (September 2003), p. 4-59; Bishara Bahbah, "Israel's Military Relationship with Ecuador and

Argentina", *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, Vol. 15, (1980), pp. 76-101. On Algerian Jews see Mualem, *The Jewish Dimension in Israeli Foreign Policy*, op. cit., pp. 51-85.

⁶⁶ See Israel State Archives, file no. 13/3516 – Foreign Office – Southern Africa – political relations - Israeli-African non-governmental level relations; This trend repeats itself in 1965, as expressed in letter by Azriel Harel, Pretoria, to Director of British Commonwealth Dept., 4 August 1965, and in letter by A.P. Haran from the economic department of the Foreign Ministry to the deputy minister of Israel to the *European Office of the United Nations*, 1 February 1965, Israel State Archives, file no. 16/3516; See also reference to this issue in reports published in the *Jewish Revisionist weekly of South Africa*, *The Jewish Herald*: "Israel Fashion Exports for S.A.", 27.10.1964, p. 1; "Major S.A.-Israel Tourists Exchange Plan", 23.11.1965, p. 1; "New Israel Start On S.A.", 13.7.1965, p.1.

⁶⁷ Yitzhak Mualem, "Between a Jewish and Israeli Foreign Policy: the Algerian Exodus 1958-1962," in Moshe Orfali, Ephraim Hazan (eds.) *Between Tradition And Progress: Leadership and Cultural Processes in North African Jewry* (Jerusalem: Bialik Press, 2005)[in Hebrew], pp. 296-314; Yitzhak Mualem, "Between a Jewish and Israeli Foreign Policy: Israel-Argentina relations and the issue of Jewish disappeared persons and detainees under the Military Junta 1976-1983," *Jewish Political Studies Review*, Vol. 16, No. 1-2 (Spring 2004), pp. 51-79.

⁶⁸ Dan Avni Seger, *The Black Continent* (Tel Aviv: Am Hasefer, 1967) [Hebrew], p. 208; See also approach of the State of Ghana, brought in correspondence by M. Bitan, Israeli Ambassador to Monrobia, with Department of Africa in Israeli Foreign Office, 16 May 1961, see, *The Labour Movement's Contribution to Implementation of Israel's Foreign Ties in Asia and Africa* (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Hebrew University and the Lavon Institute for the Research of the Jewish Labour Movement, 1989) [Hebrew], p. 135. Aryeh Oded, *Africa and Israel* (Jerusalem: Magnes – Hebrew University, 2011)(Hebrew), pp. 3-14; Benyamin Neuberger, *Africa and International Relations (Raanana: Open University, 2011)(Hebrew)*, pp. 129-137.

⁶⁹ Interview with Simcha Pratt. 19.1.1.1996

⁷⁰ Naomi Hazan, "Israel's Position in Africa due to the Changes on the Continent", *Monthly Review* [Hebrew], no. 2 (February 1962), pp. 21-22.

⁷¹ See letter of general consul in Johannesburg to Director of British Commonwealth Dept. on issue of sanctions against South Africa, 16 July 1963, Israel State Archives, no. 1/351 – Southern Africa.

⁷² Stenographic report of meeting at the Chambers of Foreign Minister Golda Meir, 15 August 1963, on South Africa. Israel State Archives, no. 28/4390 – Foreign Office.

⁷³ Author's interview with Harry Horowitz, 26 March 1996.

⁷⁴ See letter by Nitzan Hadas to Azriel Harel in Pretoria (who replaced Head of Mission Simcha Pratt), 6 November 1963, 28 October 1963, Israel State Archives, file no. 6/3388 – Southern Africa – World Jewry.

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⁷⁵ Meron Medzini, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

⁷⁶ Edgar Berenstein, "South African Jewish Community", *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 62, (1961), pp. 366-367.

⁷⁷ See on this issue Israel State Archives, file no. 6/3388 – Southern Africa – South African Jewry. See also discussion on foreign activity and influence in coordinating and intensifying antisemitic activity in South Africa, in report sent to Consul Dov Sinai from Judith Nisياهو, 5 March 1964, Israel State Archives, file no. 9/3517 – Foreign Office. See also, Milton Shain, *The Roots of Antisemitism in South Africa*.

⁷⁸ Edgar Berenstein, "South African Jewish Community", *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 64 (1963), pp. 418-419.

⁷⁹ See antisemitic responses in South Africa to the Eichmann trial: Edgar Berenstein, "South African Jewish Community", *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 63 (1962), p. 459.

⁸⁰ See letter by Azriel Garel to Director of British Commonwealth Dept. from 14 September 1965, on the issue of the desecration of the cemetery in Pretoria, in which 12 tombstones were desecrated and were sprayed with "Hang Jews and Communists; Hang Ben Gurion; Down with all Jews" in red paint. Israel State Archive, file 3517 – Southern Africa – Jews; see also letter of General Consul in Johannesburg to Mr. Dvir from Israeli Secret Service (Mossad) from 20 April 1966 in which he reports the painting of a swastika and a slogan "Heil Hitler" discovered in one of the large synagogues in Johannesburg. Israel State Archive, file 6/3993. Edgar Berenstein, "South African Jewish Community", *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 66 (1965), pp. 490-492; Edgar Berenstein, "South African Jewish Community", *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 68 (1967), pp. 454-455.

⁸¹ See report on these activities in: Gideon Shimoni, *op cit*, p. 339; "South African Jewish Community", *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 63 (1962), p. 459.

⁸² See protocol from Jewish Agency board meeting, convened in Jerusalem in 24 June 1963, Central Zionist Archive, 216/559.

⁸³ See letter of General Consul in Johannesburg to Director of British Commonwealth Dept. from 6 September 1963. Israel State Archive, file 351/1.

⁸⁴ See n. 74.